The rapid digital transformation of society, which today has covered all spheres of human existence without exception, forces us to ask ourselves anew the oldest philosophical questions. The transition from the industrial to the information age led not only to a change in the technological system, but also to a deep breakdown in the perception of basic social values. The key place among them is occupied by the category «justice». In its classical, still ancient sense, it is based on the ideas of equality, proportionality and unconditional recognition of the dignity of each individual. However, today, when we found ourselves in the era of algorithms, neural networks and limitless data arrays (Big Data), the architecture of social relations has fundamentally changed. New, previously unknown challenges are emerging that require not only a legal settlement, but also a profound philosophical rethinking of the very essence of justice.
Analyzing the transformation of justice in the digital age, it is worth highlighting three fundamental planes in which the most ethical and legal conflicts arise today: the problem of digital inequality, the epistemological opacity of algorithms, and the privacy crisis.
The first and most acute challenge is the so-called «digital inequality» (digital divide). If at the beginning of the 21st century, this term was mostly understood as the presence or absence of physical access to a computer and the Internet, today this problem has acquired a much deeper, existential character. Modern digital inequality – is an inequality of competences. It encompasses a person's ability to critically evaluate information, protect their personal boundaries in virtual space, and effectively use digital goods for their own development [2].
From the standpoint of Aristotelian distributive (distributive) justice, access to information processing tools today is equal to access to economic, educational and power resources. A person who is excluded from the digital field or does not have sufficient skills to interact with it finds himself on the sidelines of social processes. Therefore, digital marginalization inevitably and very quickly converts into real social injustice, depriving entire groups of the population of the opportunity to fully exercise their rights.
The second critical aspect that challenges traditional legal doctrines is the problem of algorithmic bias and the phenomenon of «black box problem. Modern society increasingly delegates making fateful decisions to machines. Artificial intelligence already today assesses the creditworthiness of citizens, selects resumes of job candidates, analyzes medical indicators and even helps law enforcement agencies predict the level of crime (predictive policing systems). However, algorithms do not exist in a vacuum — they learn from giant arrays of historical data that already contain human biases, stereotypes and systemic injustices of the past [3].
When a neural network denies a person credit or work based on patterns invisible to him, the phenomenon of automation of discrimination occurs. From a philosophical and legal point of view, a dangerous precedent arises here: the loss of the subject of responsibility. If an unfair decision is made by an official or a judge, there are clear appeal mechanisms. When the solution generates an algorithm, the logic of which often cannot be explained even by the developers themselves, a person remains defenseless. The human right to be decided upon by a living person rather than a soulless code becomes a new imperative for digital justice.
The third challenge lies in the unprecedented commercialization and monopolization of human life data. Personal data, or «digital traces», has become the most valuable resource of the new economy. Philosophically speaking, a person's digital profile today is an integral continuation of his personality, his «virtual body» [1]. However, control over this resource is alienated from citizens and concentrated in the hands of large technology corporations. By concluding an unspoken contract, users buy convenience and free access to services every day at the cost of their own privacy, often without realizing the consequences of such an agreement.
Classical principles of law, such as the inviolability of the home or the secrecy of correspondence, require immediate extrapolation to the virtual space. Unauthorized intrusion into a person's digital profile, manipulation of their attention or emotions through microtargeting can have as devastating consequences for human dignity as physical violence. Justice today requires the recognition of the concept of sovereignty over one's own data and the introduction of new, «digital human rights», in particular, the right to be forgotten and the right to explain an algorithmic solution.
The conducted research allows us to assert that justice in a digital society goes far beyond traditional legal positivism. It acquires new ontological dimensions. So that technological progress does not turn into a tool of oppression and total control, humanity faces the need to conclude a new «digital social contract».
This contract should be based on the principle of humanocentricity of technology, where man remains the highest value and ultimate goal, not a means or source of data. The legal mechanisms of the future should not inhibit innovation, but direct it in such a way as to minimize algorithmic discrimination, overcome digital inequality and guarantee the autonomy of the individual's will. Only with a deep philosophical and legal understanding of these challenges will we be able to build a digital reality in which technology will serve justice, not destroy it.
References:
1. Baranov O. A. Legal problems of the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies. Information and law . 2019. № 4. S. 13–24. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Infpr_2019_4_3(date of application: 11.06.2026).
2. Pikulya T. O. The mechanism of legal regulation of the digital environment: philosophical and legal aspect. Scientific notes of NaUKMA. Юридичні науки. 2025. Т. 15. С. 114–123. URL: https://nrplaw.ukma.edu.ua/article/view/333718 (дата звернення: 11.06.2026).
3. Modern society: a philosophical and legal study of current problems: monograph/ed. O. G. Danylyana. Kharkiv: National law University named after. Yaroslav the Wise, 2019. 352 p. URL: https://dspace.nlu.edu.ua/bitstreams/f8783cbe-0a0c-4400-9c87-b74664ae0199/download(date of application: 11.06.2026).
4. Tyurya Yu. AND. Analysis of philosophical and legal approaches to defining the concept of «artificial intelligence». Scientific Bulletin of the International Humanitarian University. Series: Jurisprudence. 2022. Vol. 56. S. 54–58. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Nvmgu_jur_2022_56_14(date of application: 11.06.2026).
5. Artificial intelligence, modern technologies and law in Ukraine : monograph/in general. ed. O. A. Baranova. Kyiv: NDIIP NAPrN of Ukraine, 2023. 418 p. URL: https://ippi.org.ua/sites/default/files/2100_monografiya_finish.pdf(date of application: 11.06.2026).
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